Based on its constitutional and institutional set-up, could India be rightly conceived as a 'consociational' (power-sharing) democracy?

Abstract

A Consociational democracy is a model of governance that uses power sharing to cope with societal divisions. Lijphart (1996: 258) outlined four crucial, interdependent elements, which characterise consociationalism; “Grand Coalition” governments in which members of all significant linguistic and religious minorities are represented, cultural autonomy for minorities groups, proportional political representation and an effective minority veto. India’s characterisation as a consociational democracy has been both convincingly reinforced and criticised, however much of this analysis focuses too much on contingent political realities rather than entrenched and effective institutional pillars from which they in part derive. Using Lijphart’s consociational criteria, it will be shown that whilst its political system runs on the basis of an informal consociationalism relying on the inclusive Congress Party, India’s constitution fails to adhere to any of the principles of consociationalism effectively. This is because the drafters of the Indian constitution integrated the contradictions and debates in society, such as the divide between Hindu majoritarianism and the consociationalism of the minority groups and the Congress Party into the Indian institutional structure and constitutional law. This however has resulted in the majoritarian tenets in the constitution such as the first-past-the-post electoral system undermining its more consociational elements. Furthermore by favouring regionally concentrated ethno-linguistic groups the system allows consociational benefits to regional majorities whilst failing to protect regional minorities, which include thinly dispersed national minorities. This ambiguous, unbalanced constitutional combination of majoritarianism and consociationalism is ineffective, hindering the establishment of comprehensive consociationalism in the country.